Pluralism about the Value of Privacy
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.29173/irie207Résumé
This paper responds to two counterexamples to the view that privacy is valuable because of its connection to personal autonomy. It is argued that these counterexamples fail to establish that personal autonomy is not relevant for the value of privacy, but only the cautious claim that respect for personal autonomy alone is not the only reason for which privacy ought to be respected. Based on the response to the counterexamples a distinction between value-monistic and value-pluralistic accounts about the value of privacy is introduced and it is argued that there are reasons for accepting a value-pluralistic approach to privacy.Téléchargements
Publié-e
2011-12-01
Comment citer
Bülow, William. 2011. « Pluralism about the Value of Privacy ». The International Review of Information Ethics 16 (décembre). Edmonton, Canada:85-88. https://doi.org/10.29173/irie207.
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